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ALTERNATIVES TO STATE REGULATION: 
SELF- AND CO-REGULATION*
In this study a brief overview is provided of the alternatives to direct governmental 
regulation of imperfectly competitive markets and of the evolution of the use of 
self-regulation in the past decades. We take into account the arguments in favour of 
alternative regulatory forms and compare these with their possible shortcomings. We 
show how the divergent features of different legal origins influence the framework 
of alternative regulation, including that of self-regulation. Because of the diversity of 
markets affected – at present or perhaps in the future – by self-regulation (from food 
industry through environment and lawyer services to internet, media and network 
services), we provide a detailed review of the literature dealing with the theoretical 
models of self-regulation, and attempt to categorise the various types of regulations 
according to their actors, origin of licences as well as type and degree of regulations.
INTRODUCTION
The past decade witnessed an upsurge of interest in the alternatives of governmental 
regulation of markets. This can be explained by a withering faith in the omnipotence 
of the modern regulating state that was established in the second half of the 20th 
century, intention to improve the quality of regulation, need for better governance, 
reduction of administrative burdens, and new solutions generated by regulatory 
failures. In relation to the 2008 crisis, the analyses mention the deficiencies of pre-
vious regulations and the need for strengthening governmental regulation. Some of 
the more in-depth studies call attention to the fact that the coexistence of various 
modes of regulations dates back to a longer period, their relative weight changed 
a number of times even in the past century, and alternative regulatory measures 
often complement each other (Bartle–Vass [2005]). This is the approach we chose 
as well, since we believe that the activity of market actors – especially in modern 
economies – is regulated by differing degrees of state influence, and activities of 
self-regulation, co-regulation and joint regulation can be placed along this line as al-
ternative, in some cases, supplementary solutions to direct governmental regulation.
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QUESTIONS OF DEFINITION AND OPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES
Between the two extremes of governmental regulation and no regulation, there are 
several options for shaping and influencing the behaviour of market actors. Among 
these, the most explored themes in the literature are opportunities in information 
provision, the operation of certain market mechanisms, self-regulation and co-reg-
ulation (BRTF [2005], Bartle–Vass [2005], Hepburn [2009]). Those wanting to inter-
vene because of negative developments in the market conditions (market failures), 
must consider if any type of intervention delivers greater benefits than the costs 
of market failures. If it does not, then there is no intervention. An extreme point 
among alternative choices is governmental regulation,1 when legal means are used 
to create a regulatory framework and an organisation responsible for observing and 
enforcing compliance. As a middle ground, the desired aim is achievable with the 
help of certain market mechanisms (such as tax and support incentives); or perhaps 
information and education campaigns can be launched with the use of possible cer-
tificates, labels and emblems; the self-regulation of market actors can be trusted; or 
self-regulation can be developed by government incentives (co-regulation).
Most reports and studies dealing with the topic divide state interventions accord-
ing to their intensity, with some variation in the number categories defined. However, 
questions pertaining to regulations may also be analysed from other perspectives, for 
instance, according to the market structure of regulated areas, formal or informal 
modes of regulation, root causes, objectives, or the measures of regulations. The 
focus of analysis may of course also differ depending on whether the purpose is to 
describe an existing regulatory condition, or to change it.
Alternatives beyond existing governmental regulations however show that differ-
ent divisions and typologies do not neatly correspond to regulations in the real world. 
The diversity of regulatory processes and differences in real life scenarios demand 
diverse regulatory solutions, the majority of which are some combination of the 
versions described in typologies (Bartle–Vass [2005], Coglianese–Mendelson [2010]).
In the following, we restrict our analysis to self-regulation and joint regulation.2 
partly because even this area contains ample varieties, partly because these regula-
tory forms – which incorporate elements (for example, certain market mechanisms, 
information provision agreements) of other kinds of regulation – is the most preva-
lent. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that this restriction also distances 
our analysis from the traditional approach to discussing market and sectoral regula-
 1 Governmental regulation may include: legislation, governmental implementation of public policy, 
general competition regulation and sectorial regulation as well. The categorisation of rule-makers 
and regulations as well as the role of legal and technological rule-making are analysed in detail in 
the studies of Ferenc Kiss (Kiss–Major–Valentiny [2000], Kiss [2008]).
 2 Co-regulation might be called as meta-regulation (Coglianese–Mendelson [2010]), situated between 
governmental and self-regulation. It alloys of the features of both. 
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tions, as it inevitably addresses regulation on the supply side of the market, which is 
primarily driven by the need for compliance. For this reason, self-regulation was left 
outside the regulatory literature of classic economic theoretical framework for a long 
time, and only surfaced on the horizon of regulatory analyses in the past decades.
Coglianese–Mendelson [2010] worked out a useful analytical method for the 
separation of basic characteristics of regulation. Their method takes into account 
four factors of regulations: the regulated, the regulator, the regulation as a command 
and the consequences of regulation (command).
1. The regulated is usually a business firm but it can also include individuals, 
government organisations, or non-profit organisations. One of the main features 
of the target is that it bears the consequences of non-compliance.
2. In this relationship, the regulator creates the rules and enforces compliance. 
Traditionally, the state is regarded as the regulator but as we will see this is 
holds only in some cases. It is not true if, for example, regulation is devoid of 
government regulation, or it is an activity remote from governmental interest, 
or there are signs of independency from the government. In reality, the modern 
state exhibits at least a “passive interest” in self-regulation (Bartle–Vass [2005]).
3. In the regulatory process, commands encourage or discourage certain forms of 
behaviour by the regulated (target) entities. Regulation can specify not only the 
goals but also the means to achieve them, for example, when they direct the 
regulated activity into the desired direction by standards, or they can prescribe 
performance targets.
4. Regulatory commands can have negative and positive consequences. Fines 
and sanctions can be expected for non-compliance, and subsidies or perhaps, 
exemptions from restrictions for compliance. However beyond a  certain 
magnitude of consequences the direction of negative and positive effects may 
no longer make sense. A massive subsidy given to firms that comply, for example, 
can be equal to a very serious penalty to firms that fail to comply.
This theoretical framework can also be applied to self-regulation and co-regula-
tion. Self-regulation means regulatory conditions, whereby the regulated entity 
gives commands for itself and bears the consequences. Thus, in this situation the 
regulator and the target are in a close relationship with each other. In contrast, in 
co-regulation the main role is played by an external regulator, and only the remain-
ing process phases may concur with those experienced in self-regulation. The term, 
compelled regulation is, therefore, also often used for this type, indicating that the 
regulation was initiated by an external regulator.
The origin of self-regulation is typically associated with the regulatory processes 
of primitive societies, where belonging to or being excluded from a group make 
certain behaviour more or less desirable. In these circumstances modern theories 
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examine, among others, the free-rider problem, network effects, or for instance, 
the question of credibility (Ogus–Carbonara [2011]). If conditions are given, and 
there is an opportunity for self-regulation, a number of advantages can be men-
tioned in comparison with government regulation. As a result of proximity to the 
regulated, the accumulated experiences and professional knowledge can be used 
more efficiently, self-regulation can respond to changes more rapidly and flexibly, 
putting less burden (cost) on the state and the target, and finally, the markets also 
work more efficiently due to a higher degree of commitment and loyalty on the 
part of the target. Naturally, all these advantages can only be enjoyed if public in-
terest can – beside the private one – prevail during self-regulation, anti-market 
endeavours can be prevented, and efficiency is strengthened by transparency and 
accountability.
Self-regulation or co-regulation most often take place when the collection of 
information indispensable for regulation can be solved by them. This situation 
may arise, among others, in fast changing sectors or in highly complex regulatory 
scenarios. There are many cases when an external, governmental regulator does 
not even recognise the existence of the problem awaiting regulation, or if it does, 
then cannot see the full scale and expected effects of regulation. Regulators should 
be aware of the weight of the problem that awaits solution, the damages associated 
with unsolved problems, and the likelihood of damages. The difficulty of judging 
these issues may tip the balance in favour of self-regulation when it comes to choos-
ing between alternative forms of regulations. After all, what matters in practice is 
whether the entities in self-regulation (and co-regulation) succeed in deciding in 
favour of the common social interests over the individual interests (Coglianese–
Mendelson [2010]).
REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES AND LEGAL ORIGINS
The global map of regulation has significantly changed in the past two decades. Even 
though the regulation of competitive markets is not a new phenomenon, compre-
hensive legislations that regulate competition are a relatively recent development. 
Some literary sources estimate that there are about a hundred countries that adopted 
such legislation. In one available sample of seventy countries it became apparent 
that 60-70 per cent of the countries adopted the first modern competition laws 
in the past two decades. According to analyses of the relationship between legal 
traditions and competition rules, the differences in legal traditions are reflected 
in the institutional and procedural systems of the application of competition rules 
(Lee [2005]). Summarising the effects of legal origins, La Porta et al. [2008] also 
find that the differences in rule making and regulations are to a significant extent 
determined by legal origins. Previous colonial empires played a crucial role in the 
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spread of different legal origins. There are five larger legal origins differentiated 
in the 152 examined countries: the Anglo-Saxon legal origin based on legal prece-
dence (common law), 42 countries are listed here, the continental legal origin (civil 
law) including the French (84 countries), German (19 countries), and Scandinavian 
(5 countries) sub-system; and finally the socialist legal origin (2 countries). Figure 1 
shows the influence of each legal origin in the world.
It is worth comparing this map to the annual report of the World Bank that 
takes into account the most important factors of business environment (adminis-
trative burden, constraints, costs, legal certainty, predictability) and ranks countries 
according to the broader regulatory environment of doing business (http://www.
doingbusiness.org/rankings). According to the June 2011 survey, more than half 
(11) of the first 20 countries most conducive for doing business belonged to the 
Anglo-Saxon legal system, five into the Scandinavian, and four into the German.
This picture can be further elaborated if we look at the history of public service 
regulations. In the past century, three countries played the most important role 
in the creation of sectoral regulation: the United States, Canada, and the Unit-
ed Kingdom. The former two because of their more than century-old regulatory 
traditions, the latter because of the new regulatory structure created in the 1980s 
Source: La Porta et al. [2008] p. 289.
FIGURE 1 • The influence of legal origins
Legal Origins
English
French
German
Scandinavian
Socialist
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that diverged from the American model and followed a European organisational 
framework for public services. The two regulatory frameworks also proved seminal 
for each other, many elements were transferred between the two, and this process 
was later enriched by the experiences of other countries as well. There were two 
other Anglo-Saxon system countries that have become front-runners in radical 
recreation of regulations, developing new methods and incentives, and reducing 
over-regulation: Australia and New Zealand. The accomplishments and failures of 
these countries also often feature in the literature of regulatory theory and practice, 
but noteworthy solutions were used in South-Africa (Anglo-Saxon), Malaysia (An-
glo-Saxon) Korea (German) and Chile (French). In Europe mostly the Scandinavian 
countries, the Netherlands (French) and occasionally Spain (French) followed the 
increasingly prevalent British regulatory innovations.
While law making originating from the Continental law characterised, primarily 
the area of public services (the prevalence of state monopoly, centralised law making 
and regulation), the Anglo-Saxon legal order – where case laws are characterised by 
higher uncertainty – provided more opportunity for the creation of decentralised 
regulatory forms.
Soon, besides government regulations, other regulatory solutions also appeared 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and these served as examples for other nations. At 
the same time, in the use of government regulation and self-regulation, one can 
observe a period of varying intensity even in the Anglo-Saxon countries. There 
were fluctuations between both the increase and decrease of demand for regulation 
as well as the two regulatory forms. In the United States the progressive period is 
considered to be the development of the governmental regulation (the period be-
tween 1890 and 1920), while during New Deal new forms of regulations had been 
developed (Ogus–Carbonara [2011]). In the United States the use of self-regulatory 
systems has by now become a standard practice. The Federal Trade Commission of 
the United States recently prepared a report on the self-regulatory systems in the 
alcohol industry (2008) online behaviour advertising (2009), and marketing food 
to children (2008) (http://www.ftc.gov/reports/index.shtm).
The fluctuations were typical in Great Britain as well. In the 19th century, after 
the industrial revolution, a number of forms of self-regulations were established, but 
by the second half of the 20th century their further applicability had been questioned, 
especially in periods when corporate bankruptcies increased because of business 
management problems, and in order to ensure compliance with laws, more effec-
tive deterrents were needed than before. Despite all this, today, the 21st century is 
considered the renaissance of self-regulation in Great Britain.
Using the evaluation of Bartle–Vass [2005], it is worth further exploring the 
changes in self-regulation and co-regulation in the British system. The areas that, 
even today, exhibit various forms of self-regulation have strengthened in the 19th 
century: manufacturing industry, various trades (doctors, lawyers, engineers, audi-
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tors) and financial affairs. A series of laws provided opportunity for self-regulation 
[Factory Act (1833), Medical Act (1858), Companies Act (1862)] that only laid down 
the general framework of regulation and essentially relied on cooperation, agreement 
and supervision by the regulated entities themselves. Thus, in this case one can talk 
about co-regulation that constituted a deeply rooted and fundamental element of 
British regulation until the second half of the 20th century. For this period – despite 
the emergence of opening markets in numerous sectors, and a general trend of 
dismantling unnecessary regulations (deregulation) – there were also several signs 
of strengthening government regulation. The privatisation of public services in the 
1980s and 1990s created a new regulatory environment and government regulatory 
system, but in the financial regulatory environment, the former self-regulatory sys-
tem was also tightened [Financial services and Markets Act (2000)] which resulted 
in the incorporation of nine, previously partially self-regulatory bodies into a single 
government regulatory organisation. In some professions the extent of self-regu-
lation was reduced: the profession of auditors was re-regulated in 1990, then in 
2002, that of lawyers in 1990, and in both cases the former autonomy of sectors was 
reduced. In the field of education and health, in this period, incentives of certain 
market mechanism were increasingly used, but especially, for this reason the role 
of controls and government regulators also increased.
Among the reasons that decreased self-regulation, Bartle–Vass [2005] highlight 
the decline of trust, adaptability and the strengthening of risk-avers behaviour, which, 
coupled with cases of business scandals and abuses of dominant positions, com-
pelled successive governments to introduce stronger regulations. The rearrange-
ment between the individual types of regulations, however, was not unidirectional. 
Due to globalisation, contradictory processes were also under way in trans-nation-
al regulations. In the case of trans-national activities, new regulatory forms were 
initiated by business actors, most of which took self-regulatory or joint-regulatory 
forms. One of the examples is the internet, where self-regulation by the actors of 
the industry was later supplemented by state actors as well. The classical areas of 
government regulation, such as the regulation of public services, have also grad-
ually transformed. Many believed that established regulatory mechanisms were 
too rigid and there was over-regulation. Even those who did not share this opinion, 
had increasingly admitted that there were more and more areas and submarkets 
in these sectors, which could be opened up to market mechanisms. To this end, ex 
ante type sectoral regulations were limited and the use of analytical tools in com-
petition rules were adopted as well. In some cases, there were attempts to develop 
a regulatory framework based on self-regulation, but, for example, in the case of 
connection fees, the attempt of Oftel, a British telecommunication regulator, had 
proved to be unsuccessful.
By the second half of the 1990s, demand increased for rethinking different forms 
of regulations as well as developing better, more efficient regulations, which some-
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times led to various conferences and the proliferation of different organisations, in-
stitutions and committees responsible for regulating regulations. Driven by a desire 
to improve conditions, and later, as part of its agenda, the OECD organised a num-
ber of conferences, held roundtables and prepared recommendations in the theme 
of regulatory reforms (OECD [1997a], [2001], [2004], [2009a], [2010a], [2012]). In 
Great Britain, an advisory committee (Better Regulation Task Force, BRTF) set up 
by the government in 1997 prepared recommendations for the improvement of 
regulation, which prescribed the reduction of direct government interventions and 
a more frequent use of self-regulation as an option to consider again (BRTF [1999], 
[2000], [2003], [2005]).
Between 2006 and 2008, the advisory body was renamed Better Regulation Com-
mission and its powers were increased. Concerns for improvement were also en-
acted in legislation affecting regulatory authorities. The Energy Act (2004) obliged 
authorities to follow the principles of better regulation and implement good prac-
tices. Pursuant to the Communication Act (2003), regulatory authorities, besides 
the previously mentioned obligations, had to take into account the expected bur-
den of regulations, and where possible, were obliged to promote self-regulation. In 
certain markets, the act also recommended the use of codes of conducts adopted 
in self-regulatory frameworks. Also, touching on also the operation of Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT), the Enterprise Act (2002) emphasised the importance of the 
prevalence of the codes of conduct, which was later clearly interpreted by the OFT 
as a broader applicability of self-regulation.
In 2005, the British government established the Better Regulation Executive 
(BRE) that coordinates the government’s activities in regulatory affairs. The office 
is currently under the Department for Business, Innovations and Skills (BIS) and 
its task is to evaluate the regulatory plans of the government in two respects. First, 
it must be examined whether a regulatory alternative exists that could replace and 
bring the same result as the regulation intended by the government. If it does not 
exist, the introduction of new regulation can only be endorsed if it reduces red 
tape created by existing regulations or implies deregulation (http://www.bis.gov.
uk/policies/bre/principles-of-regulation). This is also helped by the principle that 
every time a regulation is approved an existing one needs to be cancelled, and in 
the case of new regulations, their planned end data or termination must also be 
indicated (BRE [2011a], [2011b]). A recent innovation is that in order to facili-
tate better selections from classical regulatory opportunities (the use of market 
mechanisms, information and education campaigns, self- and joint regulation), 
the findings of behavioural economics must be taken into consideration (Dolan 
et al. [2010], OFT [2010]).
As well as the British government, the Australian one also made great efforts 
to promote a more widespread use of self-regulation. The minister responsible 
for consumer protection and the regulation of financial markets established an 
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advisory body called Taskforce on Industry Self-regulation (TIS) in 1999. A re-
port published by the advisory body in 2000 examined the cases when self-regu-
lation could become the most and least efficient regulatory solution (TIS [2000]). 
A Consumer Competition Act enacted in 2010 dealt with the form of self-regula-
tion set out in the codes of conduct. The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Protection Commission (ACCC) developed self-regulatory guidelines to facilitate 
compliance with the act by professional and occupational organisations as well as 
companies operating in consumer markets (ACCC [2011]). Not even the regulated 
markets were left out from the new wave of self-regulation. A case in point is the 
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). A report developed 
by this authority summarised the optimal conditions of efficient self-regulation 
and co-regulation (ACMA [2010]).
The development of better regulatory systems was supported by the systematic 
use of Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIA). A more substantial review of the quality 
of regulations also enabled increasingly more in-depth analyses of regulations in 
terms of transparency, consultation mechanisms, institutional solutions, monitoring 
and progress checks (Valentiny [2008]). This process that had started in the United 
States in the 1970s, spread to a number of countries by the 1980s, and afterwards the 
use of regulatory impact analysis was articulated by the OECD recommendations 
and incorporated into the practice of the European Union as well (OECD [1997b]). 
A recurring aspect of impact analyses is the consideration of regulatory alternatives. 
According to a survey by the OECD published in 2008, the consideration of regula-
tory alternatives was obligatory in all of the 31 examined member states, but there 
was no obligation to do so in writing in nine countries, at least one written analysis 
was required in 14 countries, and at least two in eight countries (OECD [2009b]). 
Data pertaining to individual countries is provided in Table 1.
Regular quality control of regulations and impact assessments were intro-
duced in the European Union at end of the 1990s. Many consider the disclosure of 
the Mandelken report as a decisive moment in this process (Mandelkern Group 
[2001]). The report summarised the most important principles of good regulation 
and emphasised the importance of impact assessment and weighting of alterna-
tive instruments. Following the Mandelken report, annual reports analysing the 
practice of better regulation (http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/
reports_en.htm) and the use of impact assessments (http://ec.europa.eu/govern-
ance/impact/key_docs/key_docs_en.htm) were established in the European Union. 
The Commission thus decided that in this way it could speed up the process. As 
a result of improved regulation, it was expected that, on one hand – to use a new 
term – smart regulation would be realised in the whole policy cycle, from the 
design of pieces of legislation to implementation, enforcement, evaluation and 
revision, and on the other hand, the most affected parties would have a key role 
in the process (EC [2010]).
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TABLE 1 • Alternative regulations in OECD countries
Country
Assessment of potentially feasible alternative instruments 
Regulators are required to assess 
alternative instruments before 
adopting new regulation
It is required to be provided  
in a written form
This written assessment is  
required to include more than  
one alternative
Australia always Y Y
Austria always Y N
Belgium occasionally N –
Canada always Y N
Czech Republic always Y N
Denmark always N –
Finland always Y Y
France occasionally – –
Germany always Y N
Greece occasionally Y N
Holland always Y N
Hungary occasionally Y Y
Iceland always Y N
Ireland always Y N
Italy occasionally – –
Japan always Y Y
Korea always Y N
Luxembourg occasionally N N
Mexico occasionally Y Y
New Zealand always Y N
Norway always N –
Poland always Y N
Portugal occasionally N –
Slovakia occasionally N –
Spain occasionally N –
Sweden always Y N
Switzerland always Y Y
Turkey occasionally Y Y
United Kingdom always Y N
United States always Y Y
European Union always Y N
Source: OECD [2009b] p. 106.
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TABLE 1 • Alternative regulations in OECD countries (continued)
Country
Guidance on using alternative policy instruments
Has been 
issued
Topics addressed
Performance 
based 
regulation
Process (or 
management) 
based regulation 
Co-regulation Economic 
instruments
The use of  
quasi regulatory 
guidelines
Voluntary 
approaches 
Australia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Austria N – – – – – –
Belgium Y Y N Y Y N Y
Canada Y Y N N Y N Y
Czech Republic Y N N Y Y N Y
Denmark Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Finland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
France Y N N Y Y N Y
Germany Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Greece N – – – – – –
Holland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Hungary N – – – – – –
Iceland N – – – – – –
Ireland Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Italy Y N N Y Y Y Y
Japan Y N N Y Y N Y
Korea Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Luxembourg N – – – – – –
Mexico N – – – – – –
New Zealand Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Norway N – – – – – –
Poland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Portugal N – – – – – –
Slovakia N – – – – – –
Spain N – – – – – –
Sweden Y N N N Y Y Y
Switzerland Y N Y N Y Y Y
Turkey Y N N Y Y Y Y
United Kingdom Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
United States Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
European Union Y N N Y Y N Y
Source: OECD [2009b] p. 106.
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The search for direct alternative instruments was from the outset included in 
the implementation of better regulation. Earlier, the widespread use of self-regula-
tion and co-regulation only formed an integral part in the decentralised “soft law” 
framework of Anglo-Saxon legal systems. Other countries, concerned about the 
potential erosion of government, put restraint to such initiatives. However, a White 
Paper published in 2001 as well as subsequent sectoral recommendations laid down 
the generally accepted principles of self- and co-regulation. The final push was giv-
en by an Inter-institutional Agreement on better law-making (2003) between the 
three institutions of the European Union (Parliament, Council and Commission). 
The joint resolution stipulated that in cases where the Maastricht Treaty did not 
require the use of legal instruments, there was also an opportunity for the use of 
alternative regulatory instruments. The resolution also identified cases where this 
could not be done, namely, the cases, where there were fundamental rights and 
important political questions at stake, or where laws had to be used uniformly in 
all member states.
This document was the first attempt to define in the framework of the European 
Union what was meant by self- and co-regulation. Self-regulation is perceived as 
an opportunity by economic actors, social partners as well as non-governmental 
organisations and associations to develop directives (primarily codes of conduct 
or sectoral agreements) for and among themselves (Interinstitutional Agreement … 
[2003] Article 22). In co-regulation, the legislative power defines an objective and 
empowers the above actors (economic actors, social partners, non-governmental 
organisations and associations) to reach that by their own means (Ibid. Article 22). 
The resolution articulated the conditions for the use of regulatory instruments, and 
the control of implementation of the agreement.
In most member states, self-regulation, of course, has already been at place 
for a long time in certain occupations and in the form of technical standards. But 
a more extensive, European-level self-regulation has been taking place only since 
the beginning of the 1990s (for example, advertising agencies, legal counsellors, 
restaurants, travel agencies, internet providers, hairdressers, real estate agents, etc). 
These were primarily concerned with training, recognition of qualifications, rules 
of rule-making, and hence, facilitated the flow of activities in the given professions 
among the member states. In the past years, self- and co-regulation have been 
extended by the inclusion of consumers. The number of European-level self- and 
co-regulations has been increased by the improvement of product information qual-
ity, the development of security-enhancing purchase conditions (payment, service 
provisions, maintenance, handling of complaints, etc.) and new challenges posed 
by electronic commerce (EESC [2005]).
In order to increase the scope of alternative regulatory forms and share best 
practices, an independent database was established, linked to the monitoring system 
of the internal market, which would support the analysis of self- and co-regulation. 
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In the evaluation in 2009, there were 108 operating and 17 completed regulatory 
initiatives in the database. 83 were related to the European Commission and 25 
to the European Economic and Social Committee. Among these, there were 47 
(5 terminated) self-regulations and 61 (12 terminated) co-regulations. The Euro-
pean Commission examined 78 regulations (including 17 closed cases). In 2011, 
the list was extended by four new regulations (http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i= 
portal.en.self-and-co-regulation-enter-the-database). The database features the 
legal background that led to the creation of the regulation, the objective, methods 
of monitoring and sanctions, geographical coverage, type of financing and the Com-
mission’s opinion on the regulation.
The summaries of the database analysis provide a glimpse into self- and co-reg-
ulations in some of the more important fields of activity of the European Union 
(Hoogen–Nowak [2009]). Most regulatory initiatives arose in connection with the 
European Union’s internal market, this was followed by regulations pertaining to 
enterprises and industries, and thirdly, by the energy and transport sector (Table 2).
TABLE 2 • Self- and co-regulation by sectors
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
19
90
–
20
07
Agriculture 1 1
Employment, 
social affairs
1 4 1 1 3 1 11
Energy, 
transport
3 3 3 2 2 13
Enterprise, 
industry
2 1 1 1 3 1 1 4 2 1 17
Environment 1 2 2 1 1 7
Fisheries and 
maritime affairs
1 1
Health, 
consumer 
protection
2 2 1 1 3 1 10
Information 
society, media
1 1 2 1 2 7
Internal market, 
services 
1 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 6 4 4 2 33
Public 
administration
1 1 2
Research 1 2 3
Total 2 1 2 0 0 1 1 4 4 7 9 10 11 14 13 15 8 3 105
Source: Hoogen–Nowak [2009] p. 151.
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EXAMPLES OF SELF- AND CO-REGULATION
Empirical case studies
Self-regulation often occurs when the regulated entities are “threatened” by upcom-
ing government regulation. In these cases, those involved in self-regulation usually 
choose self-regulation as a preventative action. By accepting quality parameters for 
products and services in the framework of self-regulation, it might be possible to 
achieve more favourable outcomes for the industry than under the conditions of 
possibly stricter government regulations. But these tactics can backfire, as it is often 
the self-regulatory steps that draw the government’s attention to an area that is not 
or not adequately regulated. In other cases, self-regulation is developed or changed 
in reaction to a shock effect. As mentioned by Coglianese–Mendelson [2010], among 
the classical examples is a relatively unsuccessful self-regulatory attempt following 
the Indian chemical disaster in Bhopal, and a more successful one in reaction to 
the nuclear accident on the Three Mile Island in the United States. Both cases have 
been studied extensively.
In reaction to the former case, the Chemical Manufacturers Association in the 
United States launched a programme called Responsible Care in 1988, which was 
shortly followed by Australia and Great Britain as well. In the framework of the 
programme, participants made a commitment that they would develop codes of con-
duct pertaining to environmental, health and safety measures. These commitments 
were developed by companies one by one regarding their activities and they defined 
how the stipulated objectives should be achieved. However, the association did not 
disclose to the public if its members fulfilled their commitments and no company 
was excluded for non-compliance or poor compliance from the association. The 
flow of information between the members was poor, board members could learn 
the names of non-complying companies only since 1996, and internal ranking lists 
on the compliance of companies have been created only since 2000. Participants’ 
compliance have only been verified by a third party since 2007. Research dealing 
with the programme could identify few positive aspects and claimed that there was 
more paper work than impact on the environment. There was a study which found 
that companies not participating in the programme could more significantly reduce 
their toxic emissions than those who participated in the programme (Coglianese–
Mendelson [2010] pp. 154–155).
The other example confirms though that self-regulation can be successful. Before 
the nuclear disaster on the Three Mile Island there was no need in the nuclear indus-
try to develop safety plans on a sectoral scale. After the disaster, a report prepared by 
the Kemeny Comission recommended the revision of sectoral standards, the regular 
collection of information and the preparation of independent, third-party evalua-
tions. According to some, the institute (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, INPO) 
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established by the leaders of the nuclear industry prevented the federal ownership 
of nuclear power plants. The INPO conducts regular reviews in power plants based 
on a list of recommendations compiled from 417 reports that have been prepared up 
to now. The two-week review is carried out by 20 persons and upon the completion 
of their task they prepare operative recommendations. During reviews a ranking is 
created comprising all INPO members, which stimulates sectoral actors to comply 
with standards to the fullest extent. The review material is, however, confidential, 
not even the members can have access to them. Studies examining the operation of 
the INPO consider the organisation as a good practice for self-regulation and add 
that it may be a further success factor if the self-regulatory organisation operates 
in a sector that is made up of closely cooperating members that are few in numbers 
and relatively homogeneous (Coglianese–Mendelson [2010] pp. 155–156.).
In the empirical analyses summarised by Ogus–Carbonara [2011], the adver-
tising industry is frequently mentioned as a good example of self-regulation. It was 
quickly realised in this industry that the credibility of services can be increased by 
an emphasis on professional responsibility. In spite of this, their self-regulatory or-
ganisations only took a strong line against non-complying organisations, when the 
threat of governmental regulation increased. Similar conclusion were drawn about 
the operation of commodity exchanges.
For a long time, the cyber space (online communication systems) was considered 
to be a typical example of self-regulation. In the 1990s this area was characterised 
by self-regulation and in the past decade co-regulation has increasingly become 
prominent, primarily in those fields where regulatory principles needed to be co-
ordinated with existing governmental regulatory organisations (for example, in the 
case of offensive content). The security of cyber space is, in general, considered to 
be an area where, due to the free-rider problem, market solutions are less effective. 
There is a need for some sort of regulation, but the global nature of the network 
makes it difficult to develop any feasible arrangement. There is a need for a joint 
application of self-regulation and international cooperation.
Empirical studies of self-regulation in various occupations have found rent-seek-
ing opportunities in a wide range of professions such as opticians, dry cleaners, 
lawyers or dentists. Standards developed by self-regulatory professional organ-
isations  – for example tariffs or advertising restrictions or rules of professional 
ethics – often protected the interests of regulators rather than those of consumers, 
and prevented the use of cost reduction measures. According to Kleiner’s [2006] 
calculations, in professions subject to licencing the social costs of maintenance of 
licencing significantly exceed expected benefits. He believes that the introduction 
of professional certificates demonstrating compliance would create higher compe-
tition and lower barriers to entry than licencing.
Typical areas of co-regulation are financial services, management of hazard-
ous materials, food safety, or for example, pollution. Co-regulation aimed at the 
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reduction of toxic waste in certain states of the United States provide adequate 
empirical data for the analyses of co-regulation (Coglianese–Mendelson [2010] pp. 
157–158.). First, it was the state of Massachusetts that imposed a law to limit waste 
pollution by 50 per cent. In order to meet this requirement, the state compelled 
respective companies to prepare a waste reduction plan, but only planning was 
obligatory, the content could be decided by the company and the implementation 
was not verified. The commitment merely consisted of a reduction plan that needed 
to be prepared in every other year. Nevertheless, waste reduction (between 1988 
and 2007) was higher – 90 per cent – than required by the law. A survey conduct-
ed three years after the law had taken force found that 81 per cent of responding 
companies realised at least some, but some companies did so with all measures 
that they had planned. 67 per cent also perceived a cost reduction effect by the 
introduced measures, and 86 per cent declared that they would intend to carry 
on with the planning practice, even if the state did not prescribe it any longer. At 
the same time, studies of the effects of legislation pointed out that in the given 
period, waste emissions were reduced by 81 per cent overall in the United States. 
The practice of Massachusetts, that is, the prescription of planning was followed 
by 13 member states. In these states together the degree of reduction was 30 per 
cent higher than in other states. The benefits of this type of regulation however, 
gradually decreased, and were only significant in the first six years. Overall, the 
above mentioned methods of co-regulation were considered successful, but it is 
assumed that in the long run, they would not remain effective.
Self-regulatory systems, however, are not able to adequately attend to their tasks 
in all cases. The following two examples illuminate inadequacies in self-regulation 
and a need for more direct state control that evolved in the areas of audits and 
credit rating.
The audit market
Audits were characterised by self-regulation for a long time. The professional as-
sociation of audits developed the rules and standards of auditing, and enforced 
compliance. Self-regulation was also justified by the complexity of professional 
knowledge. Auditors detected it much easier if among those performing similar 
tasks, one of the parties went wrong in the client-contractor relationship system, 
or an auditor got excessively under the influence of or was potentially mislead by 
a client. In the case of clients with diverse activities, innovative and often changing 
portfolios, those with daily contact with companies were really in an advantageous 
position. For a while, it was considered as an advantage of self-regulation that the 
costs of regulation were borne by the regulated entities. As a result of regulation, 
the reliability of the profession increases, the service becomes more valuable, and 
the costs of regulation are absorbed and feature as a price increase factor.
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After some time, however, financing was put in a different perspective. The 
financing of a self-regulating organisation within the trade questioned the inde-
pendence of the regulator. In the United States, the behaviour of auditors massively 
undermined the trust in self-regulation when during a dispute on the independence 
of the self-regulatory organisation, the auditing companies considered the reduction 
of funding (Pritchard–Puri [2006]).
Cartel formation is usually also considered among the dangers of self-regulation, 
and many see their concerns justified as the number of largest auditing firms de-
creased to four (Valentiny [2012]). Self-regulation can also encourage the increase 
of professional standards to an extremely high level, which can lead, on the one 
hand, to the exclusion of certain companies, and on the other hand, to the artificial 
stimulation of demand for services. The consistency of use of sanctions, in some 
cases, may raise doubts, but penalties can have negative effects for the whole trade. 
In the regulation of audits the mode of obtaining information is not resolved: while 
member organisations cooperate in this respect, the cooperation of the most im-
portant party, that of the client, is usually not possible due to a conflict of interest.
In the North-American continent two parallel and in many respects different au-
dit regulations have evolved. In the United States the supervision of audits was under 
the stock exchange supervisory authority (Securities and Exchange Commission), 
but in practice it was professional associations that were in charge of carrying out the 
task. In Canada the laws did not directly affect audits. The corporation law entrusted 
self-regulatory bodies with the development of professional standards and rules of 
independence. The committees of professional organisation developed the rules and 
the mechanisms of checks and accountability. The two countries differently reacted 
to the corporate crisis affecting the audits (for example, Enron, Worldcom) as well 
as the 2008 crises. In the United States the functioning of self-regulatory body called 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has received a lot of criticism. They 
reacted slowly to the demand of enforcing technologically driven changes in audits, 
while at the same time, their rules enabled certain companies to disclose false reve-
nue and profit data, thereby artificially increasing their share prices and credit ratings.
A United States law on the reporting and responsibility of companies and audits, 
which is named after the claimants as the Sarbane–Oxley Act [Corporate and Audit-
ing Accountability and Responsibility Act (2002)], was aimed at tightening checks. 
A new organisation called Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
was established to supervise audits. The act stipulated the separation of audits and 
consultancy, the obligation to fully disclose risks, the exchange of auditors, and 
a significant improvement of internal supervision (Romano [2004], Zhang [2005]).
The assessments of PCAOB became regular and the activities of the four large 
auditors in 2010 were summarised in four reports. The mistakes made during audits 
were revealed and recommendations were put forward for their correction. Irreg-
ularities were found in 26 cases out of 57 at Deloitte, in 15 cases out of 62 at Ernst 
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& Young, in 12 cases of out of 54 at KPMG, in 28 cases out of 76 at PwC (PCAOB 
[2011a], [2011b], [2011c], [2011d]). The supervision prepared a separate report on 
the activities of auditors during the crisis, it identified areas with specifically many 
problems and where evaluation standards developed by the supervision were not 
adequately used – for example, fair value accounting, income taxes, stocks, cal-
culation of revenues, accounting off-balance-sheet items, devaluation of goodwill, 
etc. However, in relation to audits as a whole, the reports did not identify serious 
problems that correlated with the crisis (PCAOB [2010]).
Canadian self-regulation reacted sensitively to the series of company failures. 
The professional association established an independent body for the supervision 
of auditors in 2002. Members of the body consisted of famous personalities of the 
business life and the representatives of regulatory organisations. The body oversees 
the standard and rule development process and keeps contact with the public. The 
Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB), a regulatory organisation established 
under the Enterprise Act in 2003, has dealt with the regulation of auditors of publi-
cally listed companies. Apart from the professional auditing association there are two 
other self-regulating audit organisations operating in Canada. After 2004, the legisla-
tion of certain provinces made it possible that following adequate qualification these 
organisations could also audit the publically listed companies, and thereby contrib-
ute to the dilution of high concentration. In line with changes to the enterprise act, 
the regulation of financial reports and auditing committees had also changed, as they 
made steps to increase their independence. The federal government also declared 
the applicability of criminal code in relation to the failures of corporate management. 
The Canadian reforms are less drastic than the ones in the United States, the CPAB is 
not directly under a government body, as opposed to the PCAOB, which is overseen 
by the US Securities and Exchange Comission (SEC). The Canadian oversight  – in 
contrast to the one operating in the United States – does not compile standards, 
and the traits of self-regulation are still very strong in the Canadian regulation.
Studies and recommendations have been made in Europe as well to analyse and 
resolve the problems of audit market. A Green paper published by the European 
Commission in October 2010 summarised the lessons of the crisis and proposed 
solutions. In certain cases, the proposed solutions follow those in the Sarbane–Oxley 
Act, in other cases they are more radical. The primary aim of the recommendations 
of the European Commission is to strengthen the independence of the auditors and 
to “diversify” the auditing market. An important part of the recommendations is 
the strengthening of supervision of auditors on the national and European level.
The internal rules of audit firms are also changing. Regarding property relations, 
the rule which required that partners must constitute more than half of the owners 
is cancelled. In line with the basic principles of audit procedures the draft decree 
emphasises professional scepticism in a separate chapter as basic rule of conduct. 
In order to create a single market for compulsory audits, a European passport is 
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introduced for the audit profession. In order to strengthen audit oversight, the in-
vestigatory rights of national supervisors are increased and their independence from 
professional organisations is required everywhere. The Commission recommends 
that the coordination of supervision matters should be undertaken by the European 
Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) (Staff Working Paper [2011] pp. 256–259.).
Credit rating market
Large and centuries-old credit rating agencies started their activities with collect-
ing and selling information and statistics about business actors. Analysing, rating 
and classification practices have evolved from these activities. Credit rating agen-
cies  – similarly to auditors and insurance companies – occupy a special status in the 
institutional system of business: their findings can be used by regulatory, control 
institutions, or even by courts, which render credit rating agencies part of a regula-
tory process. There was a time when credit rating agencies were described as ideal 
cases of self-regulation, since their products were clearly visible and their ratings 
were well-measurable. For this reason, good reputation is an extremely important 
element of their functioning and mistakes or anti-competitive behaviour can cause 
a lot of harm to their reputation. Their activities can virtually not be overtaken by 
other economic actors, the tasks requiring vast information and lots of experience 
cannot even be assumed – among others, due to lack of impartiality – by the state 
(Sen [2011], Mulligan [2009]).
The extension of the credit rating market was generated by various laws that 
related to banks, insurance companies, pension funds in the 1930s, and this circle 
had increasingly widened by the 1970s, as institutes under state control also became 
increasingly reliant on the services of credit rating agencies (White [2012]). Basically, 
until 1975, the only instrument for the regulation of credit rating agencies was the 
adoption of a handbook that contained rating principles. The American Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) decided in that year to establish a new category – the 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) – for the companies 
that provide information, and among these it immediately acknowledged the three 
biggest credit rating agencies. The control was, in fact, informal and relied chiefly 
on feedback from the market rather than standards.
In the following 25 years only four other agencies became recognised organisa-
tions, but due to mergers and bankruptcies, only three remained again by 2000. The 
exact conditions for inclusion in the recognised club were not disclosed by the SEC. 
The performance of credit agencies during the 2008 crisis was considered worse 
than that of auditors. In the United States the control rights of SEC were significantly 
strengthened by the Dodd–Frank Act intended to improve control over the financial 
system (2010), and in June 2012, an independent body, the Office of Credit Ratings, 
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was established to oversee credit rating agencies. Incompatibility rules were taken 
much more seriously for credit rating agencies than before: those working on the 
ratings have been banned from participation in the selling of ratings, and several 
aspects of the functions of credit rating agencies have been regulated. It must be 
publically disclosed what kind of conditions were used in the ratings, whether the 
rating was a paid or non-paid one. Furthermore, historical data of earlier ratings 
must also be disclosed for the evaluation of rating’s accuracy, and if an employee 
of a credit rating agency becomes later the employee of a rated company, the em-
ployee’s rating activity must subsequently be checked and evaluated. (Dodd–Frank 
[2010] SEC.931–939H).
The European regulation also tried to keep pace with the problems that arose 
during the crisis, and create a framework for regulation by formulating directives 
and decrees. The European regulation on credit rating agencies, which has been 
in force since December 2010 (EPC [2009]) was amended in May 2011, after the 
establishment of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In ef-
fect, the ESMA was entrusted with the oversight of the market and the details of 
implementing supervision have also been developed (EPC [2011]). Conditions for 
registering credit rating agencies, rules of business conduct, quality assurance, and 
incompatibility were also defined. The changes of rating methodology, after they 
are discussed with issuers and investors, must be submitted to the ESMA, which 
supervises implementation according to the principles developed in March 2012.
The cases of self- and co-regulation presented up to this point demonstrate that 
the development of this type of regulation depends on the particular legal system 
and economic environment as well as many other market and professional condi-
tions. The theoretical models attempted to provide a typology for these conditions, 
weigh their respective prevalence, and examine their effect. In the next section we 
review the economic models dealing with self-regulation.
THEORETICAL RESULTS IN RELATION TO SELF-REGULATION
The most important goal of economic regulation is to correct market failures. The 
most frequently cited market failure is deadweight loss caused by market power.3 
Market power and the resultant excessive pricing is usually addressed in the frame-
work of classical regulation, since the “self-regulation” of actors would at best lead to 
the development of cartels and thus, to more significant deadweight loss. Monopoly 
power does not only result in high prices: if the monopoly decides about multiple 
 3 Deadweight loss may arise if a firm prices above marginal cost, hence some consumers with a higher 
marginal utility than marginal cost will not buy the good. This means that some socially optimal 
exchanges do not take place.
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factors simultaneously (for example, about the price and the quality) then – depend-
ing on the elasticity of the demand function with respect to quality – it may find 
optimal to choose a too high or too low level of quality (Spence [1975]). But since 
this also follows from market power, classical regulation in this dimension cannot 
be substituted with self-regulation even under complete information.
Self-regulation can therefore be applied successfully only in those areas where the 
coordination of corporate decisions is in the interest of both the firms and society. 
A simple example for this is standardization. Fundamentally, however, the litera-
ture focuses on information asymmetries between producers and consumers. This 
usually arises in the cases of search goods, experience goods and credence goods 
(Scarpa [1999]). For search goods, consumers can only determine the quality of 
goods after paying some search costs, hence search will be higher than optimal. In 
the case of experience goods, consumers can get to know the quality of the product 
only after purchasing it, while in the case of credence goods, not even after that; this 
last group consists of medical, certain financial and legal services.
Market failure related to asymmetric information can take two forms: adverse 
selection and moral hazard; which is to say, that on the one hand, market failure 
may originate from consumers’ inability to observe the type of individual service 
providers, and on the other hand, it can also stem from inability to observe how 
much effort service providers put into improving service quality. Akerlof ’s [1970] 
model demonstrates that as a result of adverse selection, the better producers are 
crowded out of the market, and, the allocation of products among consumers will 
not be optimal either. This approach is later followed by Leland [1979] and Shaked–
Sutton [1981]. Nonetheless, in the more recent literature, authors primary focus on 
moral hazard rather than adverse selection.
Reducing the problems stemming from quality-related asymmetric informa-
tion  – in contrast with excessively high prices – may be in the common interest of 
all stakeholders, therefore, industry-wide self-regulation in these cases may rep-
resent a viable alternative to classical regulation. In case of a very strong adverse 
selection – when a market cannot even operate – it is clear that it is advantageous 
for both service providers and consumers if industrial self-regulation can control 
quality and thus restore the operation of the market. In the case of a more moderate 
degree of adverse selection, it can be similarly argued that self-regulation preventing 
the crowding out of high quality service providers is beneficial both for consumers 
and producers (Leland [1979]).
Information had a prominent role in the models of the 1990s and 2000s. The 
reputation of the industry (expected quality) is basically a public good into which 
firms invest a suboptimal amount, since the cost of these investments would almost 
exclusively be borne by them, while the benefits could be enjoyed by all companies. 
In these models self-regulation reduces this public good problem, leading to higher 
reputation and total profit at the industry level.
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While these arguments demonstrate that self-regulation leads to better results 
than its absence, another important question is the relation of self-regulation to 
classical regulation. According to the literature, the advantage of self-regulation 
lies in the more efficient use of information, but its disadvantage is an increased 
probability of collusion, which can lead to deadweight loss (OFT [2009]). For a more 
profound understanding of the trade-off between classical and self-regulation one 
should focus more explicitly on the objective functions and constraints different 
actors face, which became a focus in the literature in the 2000s.
Self-regulation receives an increasingly greater role in the area of environmental 
protection. The reduction of pollution is in itself not in the interest of the indus-
try, thus, self-regulation in this area is foremost motivated by preventing classical 
regulatory measures, such as the introduction of pollution quotas. To be able to 
model this, one also needs to model the political mechanisms deciding about the 
introduction of quotas, where the lobby efforts of parties are also influenced by the 
type of alternatives the opportunity of self-regulation represent for them.
In the following, we first present the classical models of self-regulation and then we 
move on to those models that yield a more in-depth analysis of the function of classi-
cal and self-regulations, and their relationship to the institutional system. We review 
the factors that, according to the literature, influence the efficiency of self-regulation.
Causes and models of self-regulation
The model-based literature of self-regulation started by an article of Leland [1979]. 
Its starting point was the problem of adverse selection presented by Akerlof [1970], 
and it examined whether there was any improvement if the regulator or the industry 
defined a quality threshold.
The model itself was also based on the model of Akerlof, which was structured 
in the following way. Consumers value quality, hence better quality pushes the de-
mand curve outwards. The quality of produced goods by certain companies evolves 
exogenously, and higher-quality firms also face higher costs. The model is about an 
experience good, thus consumers are not able to assess the quality of the good or 
service before the purchase. Therefore, they are willing to pay a price corresponding 
to average quality, that is the expected quality of the good in the market. This leads 
to adverse selection: it is not worth for producers creating the best quality to enter 
the market, despite the willingness of consumers – under complete information – 
to pay the costs of a better quality product.
In this framework, Leland [1979] assesses whether it is possible to improve 
efficiency if a certain quality threshold is introduced. This means that only those 
producers can sell their products on the market that exceed a critical value. The 
social value of the threshold is that due to an increase in average quality, producers 
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creating better quality goods return to the market; its social cost is that total quality 
exchanged on the market decreases. The welfare effect depends on how consumers 
evaluate better quality in comparison to greater quantity. The results show that it 
pays off to introduce such a threshold if consumers value quality highly in com-
parison to the cost of its production, and the elasticity of demand (with respect to 
quantity) is not too large.
The article analyses what quality standard will be defined by a self-regulatory or-
ganisation (SRO). Such an organisation – similarly to cartels – maximises industrial 
profits. The study of Leland does not address the inner workings of self-regulatory 
organisations: it simply assumes that they operate efficiently from the perspective 
of the collective interests of stakeholders. The study shows that if the unit cost 
function is strictly convex, and consumer demand for quality is linear or convex, 
then the self-regulatory organisation defines a higher than optimal quality thresh-
old. The reason for this is that the self-regulatory organisation – similarly to other 
monopolies – tries to lower supply by all means at its disposal, and thereby generate 
monopoly profit.
Using simple tools, Leland [1979] also writes about the problem of moral hazard. 
He examines what happens when quality is endogenous. In this case, a public good 
problem arises. Since consumers cannot observe the quality of the product before 
purchase, the company investing into the quality of its product cannot access the 
total return on its investment, and thus, the investment will be lower than its so-
cially optimal level. While this approach provides the idea for later models based 
on moral hazard, a precise modelling of moral hazard occurred only later, with the 
work of Shapiro [1986].
The study of Shaked–Sutton [1981] is another classic piece in the literature of 
self-regulation. It expands on Leland’s [1979] model in many ways. On the one hand, 
it addresses consumer preferences pertaining to quality in more general terms: con-
sumers are not only interested in general (expected) quality, but the distribution 
of the quality of those who work in the profession (for example, in health or legal 
counselling). On the other hand, it also models the labour market in detail, where 
the income of professional employees is determined endogenously. To this end, the 
authors use a certain general equilibrium model. The skills of potential workers are 
heterogeneous, and in equilibrium those chose, for example, the medical profes-
sion – as opposed to other professions –, who can provide better service than the 
quality threshold. Thus, the threshold defines the number of workers, that is, the 
size of profession, too.
Given their specific approach, the authors can also analyse some novel questions. 
They analyse all viable sizes of professions that are feasible in equilibrium. At the 
same time, they also examine the effect of the emergence of a new profession that 
provides lower standards than the original one. They find in the case of a single 
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profession – similarly to Leland [1979] – that the threshold maximising the income 
of professionals is higher than the socially optimal one, meaning that if the defini-
tion of quality threshold was left to the profession, there would be fewer lawyers 
or doctors working.
In the case of two professions they examine cases where a new profession can 
appear – for example, paralegals – that allows the entrance of lower quality service 
providers. In the model, the technical condition for this is that paralegals should 
earn more than in their alternative professions.
Two regulatory settings may explain the emergence of a new profession. First, 
a  professional organisation can be freely established. Second, the old profes-
sion  – lawyers, doctors – may define the quality requirements for the new one. This 
is not at all unrealistic: it happens often that the representatives of the highest quality 
profession decide about the quality standards applicable to “lower” level professions, 
for example, doctors define professional requirements that must be met by nurses.
If representatives of the new profession can decide about the quality require-
ments applicable to them, then the new profession may also set the quality threshold 
too high, thus state regulatory authorities may have an interest to intervene and 
to set the quality threshold at the socially optimal level. In such interventions the 
entrance of a new profession clearly increases welfare, thanks to the wider range 
of choice and the lower rents enjoyed by the original profession. If however the re-
quirements applicable to the new profession are chosen by the old profession, and 
financial transfers are possible between the two groups, then the quality threshold 
of the new profession will not be optimal, and the representatives of the original 
profession will take further rents from the generated revenue.
Thus, overall, this more general model of Shaked–Sutton [1981] confirms Le-
land’s [1979] conclusions, according to which a profession functioning as a monop-
oly sets too high quality threshold. An important finding is that the appearance of 
a competing profession may be beneficial in the case of independent professions. If, 
however, the representatives of the old profession decide about the requirements 
of the new profession, then this leads to an increase of rents for the old profession.
Shapiro’s [1986] model is the first important model that interprets quality regula-
tion as a moral hazard problem. Originally, the group of producers is homogeneous, 
and it is up to their members to decide what qualifications they should obtain and 
what quality products they create (high or low). For more qualified producers it 
costs less to create high quality products: higher qualifications and higher-quality 
products therefore complement each other. Another important feature of the moral 
hazard-based model is that the state is not able to directly regulate the quality of the 
product, only one of its inputs: the qualification of the service provider.
It is important that there is opportunity in the model to develop reputation. The 
type of products created by service providers can only be observed after a while: 
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consumers are not able to ascertain the quality of services provided by young service 
providers, but they decide about the use of services offered by providers in their 
second career phase based on the provider’s reputation in the first phase.
Without government intervention two types of efficiency losses arise on the 
market. 1. Due to the initial phase characterised by moral hazard, there is less in-
centive to produce higher quality, than in the case with complete information, which 
reduces average quality. 2. In the initial phase the allocation of higher and lower 
quality products is not optimal: the higher quality products do not necessarily reach 
those consumers who value quality, since the products are indistinguishable prior to 
consumption. This also implies that in comparison to the full information scenario, 
asymmetric information harms the situation of those consumers who value quality, 
and their surplus gets transferred to other consumers.
The state can intervene into market processes in various ways. One option is 
licencing, which means that the performance of an activity is only permitted above 
a certain qualification; this is basically input regulation. In this way, low-quality 
service providers obtain higher qualification than they would otherwise do in the 
absence of intervention. In effect, the marginal cost of higher quality is reduced, and 
supply is increased. Licencing thus increases average quality and decreases type 1 
sources of efficiency loss.
Shapiro [1986] shows that licencing only leads to an increase in welfare if the 
reputation mechanism is not too strong. The introduction of licensing, however, 
does not lead to improvement in the Pareto-sense: due to a reduced marginal cost 
of quality, consumers with a high valuation of quality are the winners of intervention, 
while those with a low valuation of quality become the losers.
The second option of government intervention is issuing certificates by which the 
state – already at the beginning of the career – certifies the qualification of a service 
provider, and thus consumers get information about the properties of the service 
provider already in the first phase. This provides opportunity for signalling: service 
providers can signal their qualifications and through this, indirectly, the quality of 
their service. If there is sufficiently strong correlation between the qualification 
and the quality, then this mechanism can fully re-establish the social optimum. In 
other cases it can happen that high quality service producers need extremely high 
incentives to reveal their type. This excessive signalling can even lead to welfare loss.
The article of Shapiro [1986] is significant because it is the first one to present 
how the quality regulation of inputs can help reduce moral hazard related to quality. 
An important innovative element of the article is an emphasis on the role of repu-
tation. If the reputation mechanism is strong and efficient in a profession, then this 
may in itself be enough to do away with moral hazard. Imperfect reputation implies, 
though, that producers can get only a part of social return from investment into 
a higher quality, and hence investment is suboptimal. In these models this latter 
effect represents the rationale of regulatory or self-regulatory intervention.
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In Shapiro’s model the issue is the individual reputation of the given service 
providers, and it is a problem that this can only be observed after a while. The 
study demonstrates that the quality threshold is advantageous from the perspective 
of society, but it does not deal with the question whether the collective organisa-
tion of the industry enables the creation of efficient self-regulation. This latter can 
also be motivated if the industry possesses a certain type of collective reputation, 
which is the sum of individual reputations, the average quality of the industry. This 
is implicitly included in the article of Shapiro [1986]: the average quality of young 
service providers can be interpreted as the reputation of the industry. But handling 
industrial reputation separately makes the drivers of self-regulation more explicit: 
if industrial reputation is a public good, then it is perfectly conceivable, that the 
contribution of individual service providers, from the perspective of the industry, 
is too low, and the establishment of a self-regulatory organisation could alleviate 
this public good problem.
The Gehrig–Jost [1995] model follows exactly the same line of thought. In their 
model companies operate as local monopolies, and with some probability, after 
a while, consumers move to a district of another service provider. Consumers who 
have moved do not know the service quality in the new district, therefore they can 
only form their expectations based on the quality provided by their previous provid-
er. This is meant by reputation of the industry in the model: in every district, new 
consumers build on their experiences with other service providers. The moving of 
consumers of course also implies that certain companies can enjoy only a part of 
their investment in reputation, and thus, the investment falls behind the optimal 
degree from the perspective of the industry. In the model, the number of sedentary 
(non-moving) consumers are the source of the reputation mechanism. This is the 
reason why profit maximizing self-regulation can improve the quality of the product.
The main question asked by Gehrig–Jost [1995] is: In what cases is it expedient 
to choose self-regulation instead of classical govermental quality and price regula-
tion? An important innovation of the model is that it highlights: the advantage of 
self-regulation is that market actors possess more information than regulators, but 
its disadvantage is increased market power, which can lead to a deadweight loss. 
The analysis demonstrates that if regulators and companies are equally informed, 
then from the perspective of society it is more expedient to use classical price or 
quantity regulation. If, however, the information available to the regulator is overly 
noisy, then self-regulation securing optimal quality leads to greater social welfare.
The research of Tirole [1996] describes a general model of collective reputation by 
modelling the collective reputation of an organisation (or a profession). Collective 
reputation is the sum of individual reputations. Collective reputation becomes an 
interesting question if the reputation of individuals is not only influenced by their 
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own but also by their organisation’s reputation. For example, if costumers conclude 
a contract with a representative (agent) of the industry, they cannot exactly check 
how many times this agent cheated in the past, but can know the general reputation 
of the industry, and with some probability can also find out if the given individual did 
not behave correctly in the past. Thus, individual and collective reputation simulta-
neously affect the expected payoffs of making business with a firm from the industry.
An important conclusion of the model is that it does not pay for individuals to 
behave correctly in companies with a bad reputation. The reason for this is that 
due to bad reputation, consumers are distrustful even toward those who were not 
caught as corrupt in the past. Therefore, members of these organisations can only 
get less profitable jobs even if they have never behaved corruptly. This may also lead 
to a situation that bad reputation prevails in such organisations where individuals 
from many generations work together. If a generation does not behave well, then 
in effect it is worth less to behave correctly for the next generation, thus the bad 
reputation of the organisation prevails.
While the article of Tirole [1996] does not directly address self-regulation, such 
an analysis of collective reputation demonstrates why self-regulation aimed at im-
proving reputation might be important. His argument concerning the importance of 
reputation is particularly important for understanding the conditions under which 
self-regulatory organisations can function efficiently. Although, in subsequent works 
this dynamic question did not receive much attention, it still remains important.
The study of DeMarzo–Fishman–Hagerty [2005] examines more in-depth the 
issue that increased market power is the social cost of self-regulation. Gehrig–Jost 
[1995] also demonstrated this. The main innovation of the study is the considera-
tion that for the efficient functioning of quality regulation, the regulator – be it the 
government or a self-regulating organisation – must perform costly investigations, 
and therefore, investigating every transaction cannot be efficient. For this reason 
the study is based on the Costly State Verification (CSV) framework proposed by 
Townsend’s [1979] article.
DeMarzo et al.’s [2005] logic has been inspired by industries, such as the financial 
market, where consumers can only ascertain the expected return of their investment 
by means of costly assessments. In the model, the self-regulatory organisation clearly 
represents the interests of the industrial stakeholders and behaves as a monopoly in 
the control of service providers. This can be interpreted in a way that the self-reg-
ulatory organisation operates in the common ownership of industrial companies 
and its objective is not to maximize its own profit.
The model shows that service providers competing in prices can function as 
monopolies if the operation of industrial self-regulatory organisation endows the 
industry with monopoly power by regulation. Afterwards, the study examines the 
role of a government regulator as well. The authors show that in equilibrium the 
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government authority does not even perform any investigations, but the threat of 
investigation can push the industry into the direction of perfect competition.
The main features of the classical models of self-regulation discussed here is 
summarised in Table 3.
TABLE 3 • The main features of the classical models of self-regulation
Study Approach Type of regulation Main innovation Efficiency of self-regulation
Leland [1979] adverse 
selection
quality threshold first model of self-regulation too high quality threshold
Shaked–Sutton [1981] adverse 
selection
quality threshold general equilibrium, more 
professions
too high quality threshold 
Shapiro [1986] individual  
moral  
hazard
input regulation: 
licensing and 
certificates
emergence of moral hazard licensing can be effective, 
certificates may lead to too 
high investment
Gehrig–Jost [1995] industrial 
reputation
quality regulation emergence of industrial 
reputation, the cost and 
benefit of self-regulation in 
comparison to classical 
regulation
if the self-regulatory organisa-
tion is more informed than the 
governmental regulator, 
self-regulation might be 
efficient
DeMarzo et al. [2005] costly controls costly controls modelling of market forces 
created by self-regulatory 
organisations, complementa-
ry nature of self-regulatory 
organisations and authorities
a self-regulatory organisation 
controlling quality leads to 
cartel prices; the inclusion of 
authorities have a positive 
effect
Institutions and the functioning of the regulator
Articles written before the 2000s do not address the incentives that a self-regulatory 
organisation faces. It is generally assumed that enterprises establish such an organ-
isation if they need one, and this will automatically and efficiently maximizes the 
industry’s aims. This, however – similarly to cartels – does not happen automatically 
in the case of self-regulatory organisations, since it might be in the interest of such 
an organisation to diverge from the collective interests of the industry.
Kranton [2003] investigates this issue and points out that in the case of experi-
ence goods and repeated games there might be a need for a certain market power 
which makes it worth for companies to build a reputation that is associated with 
high quality production. To uphold high quality, there might be a need to limit 
entry or reduce price competition. This phenomenon can justify the notion that 
self-regulatory organisations should not only deal with quality control, but to some 
extent should also limit competition. The author demonstrates that the guilds of 
the Middle Ages in Europe and in the Middle East as well as modern American pro-
fessional associations also functioned this way: they defined quality requirements 
toward professionals, and at the same time, limited competition.
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In the models presented in the previous section as well as in the article of Kranton 
[2003], there was an automatic assumption that the self-regulatory organisation, as 
a body established by the companies of the industry, will maximise total industry 
profits. This, however, is not necessarily true. The self-regulatory organisation, as an 
entity recognised by the state and responsible for the realisation of certain social goals, 
can also have another objective function. In the analyses of Javier Núñez, for instance, 
the objective of the self-regulatory organisations is the development of its own rep-
utation (Núñez [2001] and [2007]). In the models the development of reputation in-
dicates that the self-regulatory organisation functions efficiently and can investigate 
firms at a low cost. While it is not clear why such an organisation would follow exact-
ly this objective function, the analyses provide important insights on how results can 
differ if the self-regulatory organisation does not proceed as an agent of the companies.
An important advantage of these analyses is that the examination of self-reg-
ulatory and classical regulatory authority relationships became richer than in the 
approach where the self-regulatory organisation maximises profit, and the authority 
maximises some weighted sum of profit and consumer surplus. If there is substantial 
discrepancy between the objective functions of the two regulatory organisations, 
questions arise whether the functioning of two types of regulatory organisations 
substitute or complement each other.
Núñez [2001] also examines a mixed regulatory environment where there is 
a self-regulatory organisation parallel to a governmental regulatory authority, which 
also oversees quality. Both the self-regulatory organisation and the governmental 
regulator can perform investigations. Three scenarios are possible if a company is 
caught producing at too low quality: 1. the self-regulatory organisation voluntarily 
discloses misconducts, 2. it is the government supervision that discloses them, or 3. 
they will not be disclosed. The presence of the governmental regulator, on the one 
hand, directly reduces the optimal number of misconducts, and on the other hand, 
the threat of government investigation can encourage the self-regulatory organisa-
tion to conduct investigations more frequently, because this improves quality, and 
decreases the likelihood that a governmental investigation will reveal fraud, which 
would worsen the reputation of the self-regulatory organisation. This effect only 
applies to the number of investigations, but not to the disclosure of misconduct.
Núñez [2007] operates only one self-regulatory organisation, and examines what 
the effect is on efficiency if the companies can bribe the self-regulatory organisation. 
In the model, this means that companies producing lower quality and being caught 
during investigations pay money to the regulator, so that the latter does not reveal 
the result of the investigation, and thereby the company does not have to suffer the 
loss of consumer trust or the high cost of external legal sanctions. The self-regula-
tory organisation accepts the corruption offer if the offered amount is higher than 
the value of reputation gained from disclosure.
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The conclusion is that the possibility of corruption – in certain cases – may in-
crease the probability of fraud and decrease the probability of investigations. At the 
same time, even a corrupted self-regulatory organisation can be better than if there 
is no self-regulation at all, because the rent from corruption represents some level 
of motivation for investigating, which reduces misconduct. The effect on welfare 
is not clear, though, for investigations are costly.
While in the model of Núñez, the objective function of the self-regulatory or-
ganisation appears rather arbitrary, these types of objective functions can be better 
understood if there are more self-regulatory organisations competing with each 
other; in these cases it is indeed those self-regulatory organisations that can obtain 
higher shares which can more efficiently investigate the companies belonging to 
them. Caglio–Pescatori [2013] had built such a model that explicitly examined the 
functioning of competing self-regulatory organisations.
Caglio–Pescatori’s [2013] model starts from and earlier model, that of DeMarzo 
et al. [2005] for securities which relies on the costly state verification framework. Their 
study focuses on the question that if there are multiple self-regulatory organisations 
present in an industry, then how competition between self-regulatory organisations 
affect 1. the number of investigations and compliance with contracts, and through 
this, 2. the broker-investor relationship as well as the participation of the investors.
The authors investigate the securities market of the United States, where there is 
a three-tier regulation in force. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
regulates the markets and the self-regulatory organisations (the stock exchanges) too. 
These stock exchanges oversee the broker-investor relationships, where brokers and 
broker companies are members of self-regulatory organisations. The supervision 
rights of self-regulatory organisations are regulated by laws. The self-regulatory 
organisations compete with each other for higher turnover, and therefore, it is ques-
tionable whether the competition reduces the likelihood of investigating.
Thus, the model analyses profit maximising self-regulatory organisations and 
stock exchanges in an explicit way. The main conclusion is that this type of com-
petition hurts welfare, because stock exchanges gain market share with a reduced 
intensity of investigations (race to the bottom). According to the model, this nega-
tive situation would not unfold if one “monopolistic” self-regulatory organisation 
operated in the industry. The results did not change either, if the assumption on 
the heterogeneity of investors was changed, or expert investors with strategic be-
haviour were assumed.
Reiffen–Robe [2011] uses a similar model and examines what the difference is 
between the behaviour of profit-oriented self-regulatory organisations that pursue 
their own interests and others that seek the maximisation of total industry profits 
(that is, when the self-regulatory organisation is the joint property of the stakehold-
84 Balázs Muraközy–Pál Valentiny
ers of the industry). The self-regulatory organisation in joint property maximises the 
income of agents, while the profit-oriented self-regulatory organisation maximize 
the value of its shares. Since the profit-oriented self-regulatory organisation is less 
interested in the profit of agents, it imposes higher fines and conducts investiga-
tions more frequently to reveal misconducts. For profit-oriented self-regulatory 
organisations – due to more frequent controls – the introduction of innovations 
that reduce the unit-cost of controls also pays off better. The result is based on the 
logic that while a jointly-owned self-regulatory organisation will choose a minimal 
control level in line the participation constraint of consumers, a profit-oriented 
self-regulatory organisation will choose a maximal control level which is still in line 
with consumer participation.
The study also examines the effect of parallel functioning of the governmental 
regulation and the self-regulatory organisation. We have seen that the work of De-
Marzo et al. [2005] pointed out that the frequency of investigations by a joint-prop-
erty self-regulatory organisation is increased by the threat of government controls. 
Nonetheless, Reiffen–Robe [2011] draw attention to the fact that this threat does 
not matter for profit-oriented self-regulatory organisations, because the likelihood 
of them being controlled is already high enough in the absence of threats.
One can understand the functioning of governmental and industrial self-reg-
ulation better if one conceives regulation not as a one-shot decision implement-
ed at a particular moment, but more realistically, as a process in itself. While the 
decision maker can lay down general rules, it is the authorities or self-regulatory 
organisations which have to work out their detailed implementation. Since this is 
about residual rule-making powers, according to Grajzl–Murrell [2007] a natural 
framework is represented by the theory of incomplete contracts elaborated in a study 
by Grossman–Hart [1986].
In the framework of Grajzl–Murrell’s [2007] model one can endogenously 
examine the relationship of the governmental regulator and the self-regulatory 
organisation. The trade-off between the benefits and costs of self-regulation un-
fold similarly to the models based on incentives. The benefit of self-regulation – in 
contrast to central regulation – is that it is amendable with lower cost, and hence, 
is more flexible due to better informed stakeholders of the industry. The cost of 
self-regulation, on the other hand, is that industry stakeholders attach more weight 
to their own interests than what would be socially optimal.
The three main parameters of the model are uncertainty, the divergence between 
the interests of the consumers and the producers (polarisation), and the populism of 
the government which is represented by the weight of consumers in governmental 
decisions. The main results are the following. On the one hand, if uncertainty is 
higher, then self-regulation is more likely to be optimal from a social point of view, 
because in this case, flexibility has a higher value. The higher discrepancy between 
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the interests of consumers and producers calls, however, for central regulation, since 
in this case, the biases associated with self-regulation are accompanied by too high 
social costs. Finally, government regulation is favoured if the government is more 
populist, because the selfishness of producers is evened out by the fact that gov-
ernmental regulation would attach too great a weight to the interests of consumers.
The last point also makes it clear that the regulatory mechanism chosen by the 
government does not necessarily correspond to the socially optimal one. While 
increased uncertainty or higher polarisation affects likewise the choice made by 
the government, its populism increases the probability that central regulation will 
be created.
The authors demonstrate the empirical validity of the model by two case studies. 
The first one examines the difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental 
system. A number of studies confirm that self-regulation is more frequent in the 
Anglo-Saxon legal system.
The authors argue that in the centralised continental system the cost of subse-
quently changing regulations is higher both in the case of central regulation and in 
self-regulation. The benefit of self-regulation (higher flexibility) is, therefore, low-
er in the continental legal system, since given the high costs there would only be 
small changes anyway. On the other hand, the cost of self-regulation – the biases 
of self-regulators – are presumably similar in the two legal systems. Consequent-
ly, self-regulation is a more attractive opportunity in countries with Anglo-Saxon 
legal systems.
The authors also analyse the results with multinomial probit models, using the 
case of alcohol regulation. Their results confirm that there is a higher prevalence 
of self-regulation in countries with Anglo-Saxon legal systems than in continental 
countries of similar size and level of development.
The only exception in the analysis is the block of former socialist countries. Here 
the rate of self-regulation is particularly low, especially if their continental legal 
system is also taken into account. The authors explain this finding by claiming that 
there were strongly populist governments in power during the transition period, 
and inexperience in self-regulation also implied that the information advantage of 
self-regulation would not have been too strong either.
The other empirical example is the comparison of the progressive era of the 
United States and the New Deal. In the progressive era at the end of 19th century, 
the role of centralised regulation was significant, but self-regulatory institutions 
strengthened with the New Deal. The authors argue, this is explained by two factors. 
On the one hand, the progressive era was fundamentally characterised by stability, 
but after the Great Depression, uncertainty had strengthened. On the other hand, 
the perceived conflict between corporations and consumers was greater in the pro-
gressive era than in the New Deal, when exit from the Depression was a common 
goal. Table 4 summarises the studies presented in this section.
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Factors influencing the efficiency of self-regulation
In this section, based on the presented literature, we summarise the factors that 
influence the efficiency of self-regulation.
Information asymmetry between the stakeholders of the industry and the regu-
latory authority • Policy materials on self-regulation primarily identify information 
advantage for the industry as the most important advantage of self-regulation (for 
example, OFT [2009]). Interestingly, information advantage is attributed an explic-
it role only in some of the articles dealing with the issue. This argument formally 
appears in the model of Gehrig–Jost [1995], where the self-regulatory organisation 
precisely monitors the companies’ cost function, but the regulatory authority knows 
only the distribution thereof. The model demonstrates that when information is 
asymmetric, self-regulation can result in higher welfare than classical regulation.
In the model of Grajzl-Murrel [2007], the informational advantage of self-regu-
latory organisations arises in a property rights theory framework. Here, information 
advantage means that after the development of general regulations, a self-regulatory 
organisation can fine tune the regulation – in accordance with the changes in the 
environment – with lower expenses. The more fine-tuning is needed, that is, the 
more uncertainties exist concerning the exact parameters of the regulation dur-
ing the creation of the original law, the higher the information advantage for the 
self-regulatory organisation.
TABLE 4 • The self-regulatory and classical models in the context of institutional system
Study Approach
The objective function of  
the regulator Main result
Kranton [2003] dynamic  
game
total profit of the industry In order to achieve high quality equilibrium, restricted 
competition might be needed
Núñez [2001] dynamic  
game
reputation of the self- 
regulatory organisation
The regulator investigates too rarely and does not always 
disclose the results of investigations to the public; it helps if 
there is also a regulatory authority running in parallel
Núñez [2007] dynamic 
game, 
opportunity 
for corruption
reputation of the self- 
regulatory organisation
If the company can corrupt the self-regulatory organisation 
that can reduce the probability of investigations, but 
a corrupt self-regulatory organisation is still better than no 
self-regulatory organisation at all.
Caglio–Pescatori 
 [2013]
costly  
controls
profit of the self-regulatory 
organisation
The competition of more profit-oriented self-regulatory 
organisations leads to too few investigations in comparison 
to monopolistic self-regulatory organisations
Reiffen–Robe  
[2011]
costly  
controls
profit of the self-regulatory 
organisation or total profit of  
the industry
The frequency of investigations performed by a profit-
oriented self-regulatory organisation are closer to optimal
Grajzl–Murrell  
[2007]
property 
rights theory
total profit of the industry Higher uncertainty, lower polarisation of interests, and 
stronger populism of the government are in the favour of 
a self-regulatory organisation, in contrast to the 
governmental regulator
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Market power • The potential increase of corporate market power is often con-
sidered as the most important disadvantage of self-regulation. This problem can 
take two forms. One of the dangers can be that the organisation established for the 
cooperation of companies can facilitate collusion in terms of pricing, be it in the 
form of open cartels or tacit collusion. The micromodels examined in the chapter 
however grasp this phenomenon in a sense that if companies can jointly decide 
about a particular dimension of the product, then this decision in itself – without 
collusion on prices – significantly increases the market power of the companies.
This question received a lot of attention in the article of Leland [1979]. Leland 
demonstrates that a self-regulatory organisation maximizes its profits in a way that 
it stipulates a higher than socially optimal quality threshold. The same result is pro-
vided by a more general model of Shaked–Sutton [1981]. Gehrig–Jost [1995] also 
emphasises that the social cost of self-regulation is the increase of market power.
The model of DeMarzo et al. [2005] addresses mostly the problem whether it is 
sufficient for the development of a monopoly if industrial stakeholders, who exist 
within the framework of a single self-regulatory organisation, decide about quali-
ty – that is, they decide about the frequency of investigations for financial service 
providers included in the model.
Kranton’s [2003] study approaches the problem from another perspective and 
points out exactly that a high quality equilibrium cannot even arise if the self-reg-
ulatory organisation founded on voluntary cooperation is not stable, and if the 
companies do not have adequate market power.
Andersson–Skogh [2003] reach a similar conclusion as well, and they draw some 
important policy conclusions. They argue that in the case of strongly experience 
goods such as, for example, insurance markets, the judicial enforcement of contracts 
can be extremely costly. Therefore, authorities do not necessarily have to step up 
against self-regulatory organisations even in cases when they significantly reduce 
competition; often it is enough to ease entry.
The relationship of the self-regulatory organisation and the governmental regu-
lator • Most of the studies dealing with self-regulation in general regard the self-reg-
ulatory organisation and the governmental regulator as substitutes, that is, they 
examine under what condition it is optimal to replace one with the other. More 
recent research however often pose the question: To what extent is the parallel 
functioning of two regulators desirable? Whether, in case of parallel functioning, 
the advantages of both regulators can prevail, that is, the better information of in-
dustrial stakeholders can be harnessed without the increase of market power, or 
quite contrarily, it is the disadvantages of two solutions that prevail?
According to DeMarzo et al. [2005], the two types of regulators complement each 
other. Their model shows that in the financial markets, the threat of control by the 
central regulator increases the investigation activity of a jointly-owned self-regulatory 
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organisation, because in this way, lower operation costs must be paid by the consumer. 
Similar result was reached in the model of DeMarzo et al. [2005], where the parallel 
functioning of regulatory authority motivates the self-regulatory organisation con-
cerned about its reputation to perform investigations more frequently. Reiffen–Robe 
[2011] shows that this effect does not manifest itself in the case of profit-oriented 
self-regulatory organisations, as their frequency of investigations is already too high.
The number and type of self-regulatory organisations • It is evident from the liter-
ature that the number, internal functioning and objective function of self-regulatory 
organisations highly influences the efficiency of self-regulation.
Shaked–Sutton [1981] study first what effect the appearance of two “professions” 
has. According to the results of the study it is important to distinguish between the 
case when the second profession decides about its own quality threshold, and the 
case when the first profession determines the quality threshold for the new pro-
fession as well. In the first case, the new profession may define too high a quality 
threshold, while in the latter case, the quality threshold can be too low because of 
rent-maximisation by the original profession.
In the models of Núñez [2001] and [2007], the goal of a self-regulatory organ-
isation is the improvement of its own reputation. To this end, the self-regulatory 
organisation may perform too few investigations, and might often not disclose the 
result of the investigation so as to protect the reputation of the organisation.
Reiffen–Robe [2011] compared the functioning of profit-oriented self-regulatory 
organisations and the ones in the joint property of service providers. The profit-ori-
ented self-regulatory organisation investigates more frequently and introduces more 
innovations than the jointly-owned self-regulatory organisation, and therefore, is 
close to the social optimum. However, according to the results of Caglio–Pescatori 
[2012], the competition of profit-oriented self-regulatory organisations reduces the 
number of investigations.
SUMMARY
This paper presents a long line of regulatory alternatives, which go beyond straight-
forward government regulation. It demonstrates that the great variety of real-life 
market situations and the numerous available regulatory techniques have resulted 
in all kinds of regulatory solutions, most of which consist of some combination of 
various regulatory regimes. The discussion was restricted to various observed forms 
and variants of self-regulation and co-regulation especially the most prevalent ones, 
and those that incorporate some elements of other regulatory techniques such as 
the use of some market mechanisms, information provision agreements, etc.
Contrasting the use of each type of regulation against the legal systems, we saw 
that legislation based on the continental legal system was characterised more by 
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centralised law-making and central regulation (case law in the Anglo-Saxon legal 
system entailed more uncertainty), and the Anglo-Saxon legal system provided more 
opportunities for the development of decentralised regulatory forms. Besides gov-
ernmental regulation, the widespread use of self- and co-regulation formed an inte-
gral part in the decentralised (also called as “soft law”) framework of Anglo-Saxon 
legal systems. These regulatory forms later served as examples for nations all over 
the world. At the same time, in the Anglo-Saxon countries, one can observe some 
temporal fluctuations in the demand for regulation as well as in the relationship 
between government regulation and self-regulation.
A more substantial review of the quality of regulations enabled a more in-depth 
analysis of regulations in terms of transparency, consultation mechanisms, institu-
tional solutions, monitoring and progress checks. The process, which started in the 
‘70s in the United States, have increasingly spread to other countries since the ‘80s, 
then use of impact assessment has been articulated by OECD recommendations, 
and they have become incorporated into the practice of the European Union as well.
By examining the various practices of self-regulation, we can establish that 
self-regulation often takes place in order to avoid governmental regulation and af-
ter significant shock events. In larger, more heterogeneous sectors, self-regulation is 
harder to apply, as it is easier for companies to evade it. Due to the costs of self-reg-
ulation, often external – economic, social, regulatory – incentives were needed to 
launch a regulation. The analysed cases of co-regulation suggest that regulation can 
be socially beneficial even if regulation defines the aims, but not the steps leading 
to it. For traditional regulations it is required that the aims should be clear, the ef-
fect of used means should be known, and sufficient resources should be available 
for monitoring and enforcement. If, however, the problem to be regulated is overly 
complex, and its details can hardly be known, or the objectives of the regulation are 
too diverse, co-regulation or self-regulation might be an appropriate choice. The 
feasibility of finally selected methods should not be considered in themselves, but 
they should be set against other viable alternatives.
The acceptance of self-regulation has especially weakened as a result of the 
2008 crisis. Stiglitz cites Greenspan, who waivered in his faith in the opportunity of 
self-regulation and the rationalisation of market behaviour (Stiglitz [2009]). None-
theless, others contend that the crisis provides an opportunity for the strengthening 
of self-regulation, especially in that sector which raises the most objections, and 
has triggered the most direct regulatory interventions, namely: the financial sector 
(Omarova [2011], Schwartz [2011]). According to the recommendations, there are 
two things that self-regulation can solve better than governmental regulation. One 
of them is the timely acquisition of market information, and another is the recog-
nition and management of risks. According to Omarova, self-regulation, or specif-
ically, co-regulation are the most appropriate methods to mitigate systemic risks. 
To this end, mutual self-insurance should be made compulsory for companies in 
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the financial sector, so as to promote a sense of “common identity” between them. 
This system could fulfil a missing regulatory function in a complex, innovative and 
quickly changing industry, in accordance with – and as a complement to – existing 
governmental regulations. However, the main current of events following the crisis 
has demonstrably led to the prominence of governmental regulatory tasks, besides 
self-regulation, in certain areas (auditing, credit rating).
The diversity of motivations of self-regulation and the heterogeneity of institu-
tional arrangements have led to the elaboration of various theoretical frameworks. 
The literature has pointed out that self-regulation can primarily function in those are-
as where the interests of corporations and society coincide: in this way self-regulation 
is not efficient in dealing with significant market power, but can help resolve asym-
metric information problems. The literature investigating self-regulation demon-
strates a fundamental conversion, namely, that self-regulation involves information 
advantage in comparison to classical regulation, but at the same time, it also gives an 
opportunity for companies to function in a way that may result in a deadweight loss.
The theoretical literature also makes it clear that the aim of self-regulatory or-
ganisations often diverges from those of the industry overall, and this is heavily in-
fluenced by organisational functioning, namely, by the roles companies play in the 
organisation, whether they are profit-oriented, and what role reputation-building 
takes in their aims. The literature has also examined the question when competition 
is beneficial between self-regulatory organisations, and when self-regulatory organ-
isations and classical regulatory authorities complement or substitute each other.
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